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Viral Life, at Last 
 
Thierry Bardini 
Université de Montréal 
 
Functioning as re re real antiontology, viral amnesia machinically realizes 
and dissolves biological […] cultural, and technical 010110100100 […] 
mnemic structures: chopping-up hierarchic-generational descendency, 
collapsing phylogenetic tic frozen-code into ontogeny, and immanentizing 
the past to operative current. 
—Nick Land, ‘Hypervirus’, 2011. 
Bootstrapping Virality 
‘Go Viral!’ says the cover of the latest issue of the UK edition of Wired (Feburary, 
2014) that I picked up at Montreal airport on my way to Tokyo to attend the ‘Life 
under Influence’ seminar. Inside was a five-page long article on Buzzfeed, the 
‘viral lab’ that ‘mastered social sharing (and GIFs and kittens) to become a media 
giant for a new era’ (Rowan 2014). But within the article, I could not find any 
mention of the word ‘virus’—much less a definition of this entity—only its 
adjective form repeated over and over, and a mere reference to ‘memes’, the word 
that Richard Dawkins coined 40 years ago to refer to ‘mind viruses’ (Dawkins 
1989 [1976]). Think Grumpy cat. But this, I am afraid, will not help me make my 
point here. 
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Instead, I will rather react to the opportunity offered by the 
problématisation of the seminar of the concept of life itself, and offer a way to 
start answering its central question: ‘do we need another concept of life and of 
living beings?’ My perspective will be informed by some recent developments 
both in biology and computing, i.e. by the two main contemporary becomings of 
cybernetics. I will argue that we indeed need another concept of life and that it is 
already at work in these cybernetic becomings. From a renewed conception of 
what a virus—as both life form and form of life—can be, to a renewed conception 
of their evolutionary role, once the threshold between the analog and the digital, 
between carbon-based and silicon-based life, has been crossed, I will offer this 
working hypothesis: ‘can we consider life at the level of code itself, and see the 
symbiotic exchanges of code as the engine of this elusive new conception of life?’ 
But to begin, let me state that we still do not know what life is—in spite of 
a score of books with this very question for a title. Since Schrödinger’s inaugural 
essay in 1944: What is life?, J.B.S. Haldane published his in 1947, and Lynn 
Margulis and her son Dorion Sagan in 1995. That same year, Michael P. Murphy 
and Luke A. J. O’Neill edited a book with the subtitle The next fifty years: 
speculations on the future of biology and in 2002, Douglas Dix added a reflection 
on the ‘Prerequisites for a definition’ in The Yale Journal of Biology and 
Medicine; in 2008 Ed Regis went with Investigating the nature of life in the age of 
synthetic biology. Eventually, in 2012, Craig Venter added ‘A 21st century 
perspective’. 
Moreover, some might even argue that this very question—‘what is 
life?’—actually does not make sense anymore. In 2011, Stefan Helmreich made 
this point in a seminal paper. ‘A gathering consensus in anthropology, science 
studies, and philosophy of biology’, he wrote in his first sentence, ‘suggests that 
the theoretical object of biology, “life”, is today in transformation, if not 
dissolution’ (2011: 671). And his conclusion was even clearer: 
The three biologies I have presented make explicit the instability of ‘life’ in 
such other domains as reproductive technology, biodiversity, and biosecurity. 
The very appearance of the word life in quotation marks—in this essay, but 
also in many of the sources I cite—indicates a social dissensus about its 
meaning […] In the examples I have offered here, form becomes the shadow 
of life, only to outgrow it—at the same time as biologists continue to try to 
recapture it […] What is the shadow of life? The first-draft answer would of 
course be death—and a good case could be made that today’s biopolitics 
are ever more entangled with necropolitics. But this is not quite right, since 
the better question is: what can we see in the shadow of life’s limit? Answer: 
the absence of a theory for biology; reaching the limit of life reveals what 
was there all along, that there is no once and for all theoretical grounding for 
life. (694–5) 
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One might then conclude, after Helmreich, that there is no answer to what 
‘life’ might actually be to be found in theory. So, in agreement with my 
cybercultural opening, I decided to ask the most influential answer-providing 
engine today: Google™. Here is what the oracle answered. First, it confirmed my 
intuition since ‘Life is a problem’ scored 99,900,000 hits, by far the most any 
queries I tried returned that day. So I resumed entering attempts to define life in 
one formula, and here are the results (in decreasing scores in hits): 
‘Life is a chance’      92,300,000 
‘Life is a gift’     59,700,000 
‘Life is a process’    28,100,000 
‘Life is a product’    27,600,000 
‘Life is a challenge’      26,100,000 
‘Life is a solution’      22,900,000 
‘Life is a disease’            9,920,000 
‘Life is change’          2,860,000 
‘Life is shit’         2,270,000 
‘Life is a dream’               926,000 
‘Life is a journey’                902,000 
‘Life is a game’                            319,000 
‘Life is code’                   16,400 
Hence: ‘Life is paradoxical’          68,700 
Why, paradoxical? Well the conclusion was obvious, since ‘Life is’ scored 
71,700,000 hits (and the mere word ‘Life’ 1,480,000,000 hits). Life, indeed, must 
be paradoxical according to Google, if ‘Life is a problem’ returned a good 20 
million more hits than the apparently simpler ‘Life is’ (explain this, you mighty 
engine!). To keep up with this paradoxical stance, I thus propose to reflect here on 
‘viral life’, quite a paradoxical expression for quite a paradoxical entity. In fact, in 
the remainder of the present paper, I will develop the paradoxical status of the 
virus with regard to life at three intertwined levels: (1) at the level of life/death 
itself; (2) at the level of a potential opposition, or not, of life forms and forms of 
life (more later on this distinction); and (3) at the level of the substratum or 
modalities of life itself, in tension between carbon and silicate, or in other words, 
in between analog and digital life (whatever that is). I intend to develop these 
points, n’en déplaise à mon épigraphe, as an ontological point, or better said, as 
an ontogenetic argument. ‘The virus’ here is no metaphor, and even less a set of 
metaphors, where the biological virus (analog) would stand for the computer virus 
(digital), or vice versa. ‘Natural’ life form and ‘artificial’—fabricated or 
programmed—form of life, the virus is both, and thus ideally—because 
ontogenetically—located at the critical point between nature and culture, an actual 
entity where their convergence manifests itself. So let me introduce the virus… 
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The First Convergent Entity 
It was in 1981 that Elk Cloner, the first computer virus in the wild (i.e. affecting 
PCs), was documented, although Wikipedia informs us that there were programs 
analog to what we now call ‘viruses’ during the 1970s: Creeper, on PDP-
10/TENEX in 1971, Rabbit or Wabbit, in 1974, and ANIMAL on Univac 1108 in 
1975 (Wikipedia, entry ‘Timeline of computer viruses and worms’). Elk Cloner 
predated the experimental work that ‘officially’ defined computer viruses and 
spread on Apple II. When infected, the monitor of the computer displayed the 
following rhyme: ‘It will get on all your disks / It will infiltrate your chips / Yes 
it's Cloner! / It will stick to you like glue / It will modify ram too / Send in the 
Cloner!’ 
Two years later, on November 3, 1983 the first ‘official’ computer virus 
was conceived of as an experiment to be presented at a weekly seminar on 
computer security. Fred Cohen first introduced the concept in this seminar, and 
his PhD supervisor, Len Adleman, proposed the name ‘virus’. In his presentation, 
Cohen defined a computer virus as ‘a computer program that can affect other 
computer programs by modifying them in such a way as to include a (possibly 
evolved) copy of itself’, a definition he would stick to in his subsequent paper 
(Cohen 1984), and one that would become the official definition of a ‘computer 
virus’. Cohen produces such an ‘infection’ within a Unix directory-listing utility, 
proving that identifying and isolating computer viruses is a non-computable 
problem. This later result, maybe the most crucial point in Cohen's work, meant 
that fighting the infection was therefore impossible to achieve using an algorithm.  
According to Cohen, the first use of the term virus to refer to an unwanted 
computer code occurred in David Gerrold’s 1972 science fiction novel, When 
HARLIE was one. In an interview, Len Adleman concurred with Cohen: ‘The 
term “computer virus” existed in science fiction well before Fred Cohen and I 
came along. Several authors actually used that term in science fiction prior to 
1983. I don't recall ever having seen it, perhaps it was just a term whose time had 
come. So I did not invent the term. I just named what we now consider computer 
viruses “computer viruses”’ (Krieger 1996). Indeed, it was a term whose time had 
come! 
So, sometime between 1971 and 1983, the virus turned digital, in science 
fiction and computer code. In 1992, 1300 computer viruses were recorded, an 
increase of 420% from December 1990. By November 1990, one new virus was 
discovered each week. At the beginning of the millennium, between 10 and 15 
new viruses appeared every day. From December 1998 to October 1999, the total 
virus count jumped from 20,500 to 42,000. Today, the latest reports detect 
200,000 new malicious programs per day (Kaspersky lab 2012). Viruses have 
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temporarily lost their title as the most pervasive forms of cyber attacks: in 2012, 
they amounted to approximately 8% of the causes of the 1.5 billion web-based 
attacks and more than 3 billion infected files that were detected. This figure, 
however, can be understood as a sign of their ‘comeback’: a year later, Tim Rains 
wrote on the Microsoft Security Blog ‘The relative prevalence of viruses has been 
trending up […] Viruses simply didn’t support the profit motive many attackers 
had in the same way that Trojan downloaders and droppers, miscellaneous 
Trojans, and password stealers and monitoring tools all did’. But, as another 
analyst put it, ‘new threats are sparking a comeback’ (Rains 2013). 
This spectacular progression, and the parallel genealogy and epidemiology 
of the scariest (retro)virus of all—HIV, of course—led me to diagnose in 2005 the 
double nature of this troubling entity and hence emphatically conclude that the 
virus was indeed the first convergent entity according to codes (from bits to bases), 
i.e. the first entity to have officially crossed the threshold between the analog and 
the digital ‘worlds’. My ‘hypervirus’ paper—as my piece for CTheory was titled 
(Bardini 2006)—was in fact far from being the first to jump this particular gun. 
Scott Bukatman had already claimed ‘one must further recognize and accept the 
pervasiveness of the viral trope within postmodernism’ (1993: 347). 
A few years later, but still ahead of my own ‘clinical report’, another paper 
with the same title, from the greatly delirious Nick Land, pretty much made the 
same point: ‘Whatever ultramodernity places under the dominion of signs’ he 
wrote, ‘postmodernity subverts with virus. As culture migrates into partial-
machines (lacking an autonomous reproductive system) semiotics subsides into 
virotechnics’ (2011: 383). 
Now, when Bukatman and Land say ‘trope’ and mean ‘figure’, I suggest 
‘entity’. Some were prompt to correct me, back in 2006: one trope maybe, but 
definitely two entities that happen to be, by the power of fiction, called by the 
same name, computer (i.e. digital, in bits) and biological (i.e. analog, in bases) 
viruses. Some implied that it was a mere metaphor on my part (since ‘mere’ 
always precedes ‘metaphor’ in their mouth), or even, God forbid, that I was joking. 
Well, I was not, and today I feel vindicated at last, by the efforts of Craig Venter 
and his bunch of maverick biologists, computer scientists, and other bio-
informaticians. 
Last July, exactly 70 years after Erwin Schrödinger had delivered his 
famous lecture at Trinity College in Dublin—the lecture that bootstrapped his 
book titled What is Life?—Craig Venter updated it with an added subtitle: ‘A 21st 
Century Perspective’ (Venter 2012). There, in the very same amphitheater, Venter 
took a mere 40 minutes to officially kick start what he calls ‘the digital age of 
biology’, or what I call ‘genetic capitalism’, aka Venter capitalism. He explained 
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how he and his group of mavericks actually synthetized, allegedly ‘from scratch’, 
their first convergent entity. Of course, it was a virus, named PHI X 174. They 
chose this particular virus, he said, because it is where ‘DNA history started’. 
Venter loves to appear as a pioneer, even at the price of repeating history: PHI X 
174 was indeed the first DNA virus ever sequenced, back in 1976, by Fred Sanger 
and his team. You see, history repeats itself, but with a twist: sequenced first, 
synthetized second, thus vindicating my confusion between reading/writing and 
being. 
PHI X 174 was not, however, the first virus to be synthetized. In 
2002 Eckard Wimmer's group at SUNY Stony Brook succeeded in synthesizing a 
poliovirus from its chemical code, producing the world's first synthetic biological 
virus. Rather, PHI X 174 was the first in a series of biological syntheses that 
would eventually led Craig Venter’s team to synthetize ‘from scratch’ an 
organism with a minimal genome, a bacterium called Mycoplasma laboratorium 
and nicknamed Synthia, in 2010. Synthia was probably not the first synthetic life 
form, but it was certainly the first heavily mediatized bioinformatics entity, whose 
alternate existence as a form of life was acknowledged and even claimed by its 
creators.  
For instance, the acme of Venter’s PR job was obvious in his recycling of 
the practice of ‘marking’ synthetic entities—Wimmer and his group had initiated 
this practice in 2002 in inscribing 19 marker genes in their synthetic poliovirus. 
This however was a standard technical practice designed to allow one to 
distinguish the synthetic virus from its ‘natural’ counterparts. Venter and his 
colleagues, on this other hand, raised it to the next level of public awareness. They 
transformed the markers into ‘watermarks’ (their own term), and in an excess of 
demiurgic hubris, included a few ‘messages’ significant for humans, insignificant 
(alas?) for the bacterium, into the sequences of Synthia. They thus wrote the 46 
names of the scientists who contributed to the effort, and also a message with an 
URL. To do so, they developed ‘a whole new code where by [they] could write 
the English language complete with numbers and punctuation in DNA code’.1 
They thus signed their engineered creature, and furnished their philosophy in its 
very code: a life form and a form of life had eventually merged. This ‘philosophy’ 
came in the form of three reverse transcribed quotes that read: ‘To live, to err, to 
recreate life out of life’ (James Joyce), ‘see things not as they are, but as they 
might be’ (Robert Oppenheimer), and ‘what I cannot build, I cannot understand’ 
(Richard Feynman). In fact, they learned later that Feynman rather had once 
written (on a blackboard), ‘what I cannot create, I do not understand’, which, 
																																								 																				
1	Had	 they	 studied	 their	 art	 history,	 these	 apprentice	 artists	would	 have	noticed	 that	 Eduardo	
Kac	had	already	designed	such	a	language	for	his	Genesis	piece	as	early	as	1999.	See	Kac	(2007).	
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Venter (2012) says, ‘is a much better quote’. They dutifully rectified this first 
significant bug, and life thus stood, anew and corrected. 
In their very informed and clear keyword entry about the notion of life 
form, Stefan Helmreich and Sophia Roosth show that these two expressions (life 
form, or life-form, and form of life) both originate as alternate translations in 
English of the German Lebensform (2010: 31). There was thus a time when one 
could be taken for the other, for instance, when Wilhelm von Humboldt’s used 
Lebensform as a synonym for custom, way of life, or even culture. This sense 
however came to be later translated exclusively in English as ‘form of life’, in the 
tradition of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s use of Lebensform, in his 1953 Philosophical 
investigations, ‘to refer to a frame of reference within which linguistic action 
becomes meaningful’ (Helmreich & Roosth 2010: 45). So, I say that in the first 
‘signed’ virus a life form and a form of life converge and merge, I mean that this 
virus is both ‘something living’ and a ‘frame of reference for linguistic action’, 
nature and culture united through the medium of genetic inscription. 
Proceeding backward from their achievement into a reading/re/writing of 
the whole history of molecular biology with some interspersed elements from the 
history of computing, Venter (2012) boldly albeit logically went to its conclusion: 
‘Life is code’ now, and the (cybernetic) loop was eventually closed. And a new 
entity is with us to prove it. It is indeed a convergent virus, a virus with a coding 
twist, PHI X TWIST, a synthetic PHI X 174 plus the virtuality of watermarks to 
come. This small feat did not pass unnoticed but rather created a media frenzy of 
epic proportions that eventually secured Craig Venter’s position as the main 
figurehead of a new form of capitalism based on creature engineering. The 
convergence of forms of life and life forms was ready to become a fact of life, and 
new kinds of creature engineers followed on Venter’s foot. As Eckard Wimmer 
had said from the start, in 2002: ‘the world had better be prepared’ (Whitehouse 
2002). 
So now you have it: Synthia, the first entity crossing the digital/analog 
threshold was born, or rather, claimed Venter in a PR effort worthy of his 
reputation, ‘the first species to have the computer as a parent’ (Venter 2012) —
besides Katherine Hayles (2005), that is—was synthetized. I was not joking back 
in 2005, I was merely anticipating the official birth certificate: the first convergent 
entity exists, and its name is PHI X TWIST. It is both a computer virus and a 
biological virus. It exists, I say—after Venter—but is it alive? Here again, the 
answer comes with a twist, because… 
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Bad Old Viruses Aren’t What They Used to Be 
At first viruses used to be… well, virulent! This apparent pleonasm was dispelled 
quite early on, with the discovery (by a French Canadian, among others, if I may 
add) of the so-called temperate bacteriophages (viruses infecting bacteria and 
named after Bach’s ‘Well-Tempered Clavier’), of which the Lambda Phage is the 
archetypical example. I will not expand on details, suffice to say that these viruses 
present two etiological modes (of life, more on this later): 
- In their lytic mode, they are indeed virulent. They replicate inside their 
bacterial host until they make its membrane explode (this is called lysis). 
- In their lysogenic mode, they insert their genome inside their bacterial 
host’s genome (and are then named ‘prophage’). Whenever their host 
reproduces (by mitosis, or cell division), their genome is thus replicated 
with the bacterial genome. 
Let this mind worm dwell in your consciousness for a while, before we go back at 
it. Before, I need to establish a second point of crucial interest. 
Viruses also used to be… semi-living, or half dead; well, not exactly dead 
or alive, but neither or both (the paradox returns with a vengeance). Calling them 
dead or alive was, after all, ‘a matter of taste,’ as was once famously proclaimed 
by a French man of Nobel authority (Quoted in Villarreal 2004: 105; see also 
Lwoff 1957). But that changed at the end of the first decade of the new 
millennium with the discovery of a score of new viruses with nice names 
(SPUTNIK, MIMI and MAMA viruses), thanks to the work of the French CNRS 
Research (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, or National Center for 
Scientific Research) Unit in Emerging and Infectious Tropical Diseases based in 
Marseille. They found a few new giant viruses—including ‘MIMI’, which stand 
for MIcrobe MImicking virus, a virus as big as a bacterium, and, moreover 
SPUTNIK, a much smaller virus… infecting MIMI. Think about it, a cannibal 
virus (after all ‘phage’ comes from the Greek phagein, meaning to eat or digest)! 
That led one of their principal investigators, Jean-Michel Claverie, to proclaim: 
‘Sure enough, this giant virus is an organism, since it can be sick’ (Quoted in La 
Presse 2008). 
Not long ago, biologists could tell us without blushing that nothing was 
alive under a certain scale, and molecular biology was a kind of oxymoron. An 
organism was alive, if a metazoan, its organs and cells could be alive too, but at 
the infra-cellular level, it was pure molecular machines, pumps (in the membrane), 
batteries and/or engines (mitochondria), reading/writing heads (ribosomes) and 
even computers of the Turing kind (nucleic acids). What now if viruses—
basically elementary nucleic acids, plus a few proteins—are declared to be 
‘organisms’? One would be tempted to consider that code itself could be 
	
T.	Bardini.	Viral	Life,	at	Last	
	
NatureCulture	2017	
Copyright	owned	by	the	authors	
98	
considered alive… making Venter’s proclamation work both ways: if life is code 
(albeit a mere 16,400 Google hits), could code be life? I suspect Venter would not 
go as far, since there are mavericks, and there are… mavericks. 
Now that being said, let us turn back to lysogeny and follow it to its end. 
At the end of this etiological mode, the virus reverts to its lytic mode. The 
prophage is excised from the bacterial genome and further encapsided. The 
capsid is a kind of coat of proteins that protects the virus in the wild, outside of its 
host—when it is called a virion. But when the excision is imperfect, the new 
virions carry within their own genome some bacterial sequences that were close to 
the original insertion site of the prophage. If these virions infect a new host and 
enter a new lysogenic mode, they thus introduce these sequences from their first 
host into the genome of their new host, along with their own genome—if that 
means anything at all. In other words, they carry over bacterial sequences. 
Fantastically enough, biologists call this process transduction, the same word 
Gilbert Simondon (2005) uses to refer to the most basic process in his philosophy 
of individuation applying both to life forms and forms of life (respectively vital 
and psychic individuations in his vocabulary). It is also the most basic process of 
what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987: 10) used to call aparallel evolution. 
Nowadays, it is called horizontal or lateral genetic transfer (Bushman 2002), but 
the change of name does not do anything to the strength of their intuition. It is 
also, by the way, the most basic process of gene transfer used in biotechnologies 
(aka recombinant DNA). 
And this, precisely, is the beginning of my point: transduction should give 
us the key to this new ontology I called for in my answer to the inaugural question 
of the seminar. This ontology would in fact be an ontogenetics, thus reuniting 
these two inseparable aspects of a same reality that constitutes a sole process of 
hetero-organization, according to the fantastic formulation of Jean-Jacques 
Kupiec (2008). If one enters into the details of Gilbert Simondon’s intuition, one 
could say that viral transduction effectively describes this minimal internal 
resonance of the living, in the very way that viral existence consists exactly in the 
perpetual relation of the internal milieu and the external milieu that the individual 
operates inside itself.  
To understand why viral interiority defines this minimal vital interiority 
one must not confuse the virus with the virion. In Simondonian terms, the virus is 
exactly the set of all these phases: virions and prophage, encapsided or eclipsed,2 
and none taken independently of the other suffices to characterize a virus as a life 
																																								 																				
2	This	last	term	is	how	biologists	call	this	moment	of	the	infection,	when	the	virion	inside	its	host	
loses	 its	 capsid	 and	 becomes	 free	 code,	 when	 the	 bacterial	 internal	 milieu	 becomes	 its	 own	
internal	milieu.	
	
T.	Bardini.	Viral	Life,	at	Last	
	
NatureCulture	2017	
Copyright	owned	by	the	authors	
99	
form. If the virus is alive, it is alive through all the phases of its existence, even 
when it falls out of step with itself [quand il se déphase]. Encapsidation and 
eclipse are the twin processes of the interchange of internal/external milieu, when 
the virus exists in between prophage and virion, in an unperceivable difference 
[une difference imperceptible]. 
Simondon’s transductive doubling means this for the virus: it is both the 
result and the operator of a primordial transduction (lateral gene transfer). The 
transductive viral umwelt, to speak like von Uexküll,3 is ambiguous: it is this 
exact alternation of interior and exterior that the presence or absence of a few 
proteins cannot summarize. This umwelt is relative because these differences of 
internal/external milieu, as well as self/other code are both relative. Literally 
speaking, one could conclude that the notion of the virus’s ‘own code’ does not 
make sense at all: through transduction, this code might always be some other’s 
code (bacterial or even viral, or otherwise), exactly as its internal milieu is 
alternatively its own (when encapsided) or another’s (when eclipsed). 
Life itself, at its inferior threshold, at its barest, is this unperceivable 
difference, this relative difference whence the internal milieu recomposes itself 
into an external milieu, and vice-versa, whence its own code turns into another. 
Claude Bernard once famously stated ‘life is the result of the contact of an 
organism and its milieu; we cannot understand life with the organism alone, nor 
with its milieu alone’ (Quoted in Kupiec 2008: 164). The virus as the most 
rudimentary form of life/life form, is neither autonomous nor dependent, but both, 
alternatively; it is neither one nor multiple, neither individual virion nor multitude 
of free codes, colonies or populations, but alternately both. It is the disparate and 
disparation itself, pure immanence. As the scholastics used to say, it is more and 
less than one, pure haecceity. And as Muriel Combes comments on Simondon, 
‘the individual here is pure relation: it exists between two colonies, without being 
integrated into either, and its activity is an activity of amplification of being’ 
(Combes 2013: 24). 
So, let me recapitulate all this with help of some recent conclusions of 
contemporary virology. Once viewed as semi-living or even living-dead entities, 
molecules or organisms, or both, or neither, viruses are now considered as 
																																								 																				
3	Zach	Blas	(2012)	contends	that	von	Uexküll’s	‘premise	that	things	do	not	have	an	autonomous	
existence	from	the	creatures	that	perceive	them’	makes	it	necessary	to	use	‘a	second	theoretical	
tool,	media	theorist	Ian	Bogost’s	alien	phenomenology,	which	helps	break	from	this	position’	(34).	
For	von	Uexküll	 indeed,	‘No	one,	who	has	the	least	experience	of	the	Umwelten	of	animals	will	
ever	harbour	the	idea	that	objects	have	an	autonomous	existence	that	makes	them	independent	
of	 the	subjects’	 (von	Uexküll	2001:	108).	Contrary	 to	Blas,	 I	am	quite	at	ease	with	 this	position	
that	I	also	share	with	Tim	Ingold	(2011),	who	first	made	me	notice	the	confusion	between	‘object’	
and	‘thing’	at	work	here.	
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‘essential agents within the roots and stem of the tree of life’, and their ‘very 
genetic volatility… an essential precondition for life’ (Villareal & Witzany 2010: 
706). To fully understand this paradigmatic dimension, one should probably 
generalize the viral transduction to all forms of code itself. One should move from 
the virus to the retrovirus through the intermediate phase of the temperate phage, 
to the retrotransposons: so many names for the same basic transductive process, 
for so many etiologies. One should follow the amplification of being in the 
inversions and their circular causality, the bootstrap loops of code itself, never 
exactly the same nor another. One should finally understand that nothing 
essentially distinguishes the nucleic acids of so-called ‘superior forms of life’ 
from that of mere viruses. Fluxes of code and capture of codes, a sole relation 
runs at all levels of being, in all of its phases. 
Moreover, ‘the concomitant discoveries of increasingly host dependent 
parasitic cellular organisms with a less than minimal genome, and of increasingly 
complex giant viruses simply using the cytoplasm of their host as a rich medium, 
suggest that the historical abrupt frontier between the world of viruses and the one 
of cellular parasites or symbionts might have to give way to a continuous 
transition’ (Claverie & Abergel 2012: 200). This continuous transition recasts 
significantly the problématique of the lower boundary of life and helps us to 
understand how ‘the symbiotic role of viruses in host evolution’ can indeed be 
‘seen to be both major and universal’ (Villareal & Ryan 2011: 88). Moreover, as 
we will now see, the role viruses could play in ‘the symbiotic view of life’ 
(Gilbert, Sapp & Tauber 2012) might not be only as key actors in lateral genetic 
transfers but also in ecological terms strictly. Altogether, viruses can then be 
understood as the entity of choice to develop a new understanding of life, at a time 
when synthetic biology is getting ready to give it/them a bright (?) new future. I 
will now close this loop, and consider the full extent of this convergent life, and 
carry over the lessons of analog virology to a critical virology, analog and digital.  
Artificial Life Forms, Really 
In 1960, a psychologist named J. C. R. Licklider probably changed forever the 
agenda of computing research in the United States of America. In a 
groundbreaking paper, he introduced the notion of ‘man-computer symbiosis’. I 
have shown elsewhere (see Bardini 2000: 19–24) how this notion of ‘symbiosis’ 
would prove to be very strategic in the context of the management of the U.S. 
Department of Defense Advanced Research Project Agency Information 
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Processing Techniques Office (ARPA-IPTO).4 Here I rather want to stress more 
the conceptual importance of this paper. Licklider (1960: 4) defined ‘symbiosis’ 
in the same way the biologists usually do, as ‘the cooperative living together in 
intimate association, or even close union, of two dissimilar organisms’. To him, 
this paper ‘was largely about ideas for how to get a computer and a person 
thinking together, sharing, dividing the load—mainly heuristic versus algorithmic’ 
(Aspray and Norberg 1988). 
He developed this opposition in a subsequent paper, where he made clear 
that the former term was usually understood as the dominion of the human, and 
the latter, of the computer: ‘in the general run of computer application today’ 
wrote Licklider, ‘the heuristic aspects of problem solving are almost wholly 
separated from the algorithmic aspects. The heuristic contributions are made by 
human problem solvers, before their programs get into a computer. Then the 
heuristic contributions cease abruptly, and the execution of algorithms begins’ 
(Licklider 1965: 19). These two papers were very important in establishing a 
program of research on interactive computing that Licklider implemented during 
his tenure at the head of ARPA-IPTO. But they also meant something more 
profound, that we are just getting to understand fully: through the somewhat 
metaphorical use of the notions of ‘symbiosis’ and ‘partnership’, they effectively 
allowed us to consider the computer as a life form, a partner or symbiotic 
organism. 
The notion of the computer conceived as a creature, was in fact not new 
when Licklider published his two papers in the first half of the 1960s. Numerous 
attempts to locate culturally the computer inside the tradition of the artificial 
creature, from the golem to various automata, have been published already. Here I 
will focus on one in particular, very much in tune with the aim of the present 
paper: artificial life (ALife). In parallel with the inception of the research program 
in computing known as ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI), devoted to emulating 
thought in computing machines, the idea of emulating life itself was also present 
in the mind of some early cyberneticists, starting with John von Neumann. In the 
early 1950s von Neumann started research in ‘cellular automata’ in an attempt ‘to 
develop an abstract model of self-reproduction in biology—a topic which had 
emerged from investigations in cybernetics’ (Wolfram 2002: 876). Here again, I 
will not dwell on a detailed history of the field of ALife, which has been already 
well covered in the literature (e.g. Levy 1992; Helmreich 1998). For some 
obvious reasons ALife interests me here, if only because it focuses on the 
																																								 																				
4	ARPA-IPTO	was	the	most	important	funding	agency	for	early	research	on	interactive	computing	
in	the	U.S.	during	the	1960s.	See	Norberg	and	O'Neill	(1996).	For	more	on	Licklider	himself,	see	
Waldrop	(2002).	
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possibility of emulating life not at the level of the computer hardware but rather at 
the level of software, i.e. Licklider’s algorithms.  
Among the said algorithms, computer viruses were eventually considered 
as potential life forms, as concrete, albeit ‘immaterial’ realizations of artificial 
life: ‘many Artificial Life researchers point to computer viruses as evidence of the 
spontaneous emergence of artificial life’ (Helmreich 1998: 129).5 This claim, 
however, requires certain precisions. On such precision was given by a researcher 
whom Helmreich interviewed for his research: ‘“Life” can only be defined with 
respect to a particular physics. A computer virus is almost “alive” as a real virus 
(not yet, but close), but only in the physics of the computer memory’ (78). 
Moreover, it seems the whole field got caught in a definitional problem, perhaps 
best expressed by one of the most cited paper on this debate: ‘The first, and 
obvious, question is “What is life?” Without an answer to this question, we will be 
unable to say if a computer virus is “alive”’ (Spafford 1994). Computer scientists 
were thus drawn towards the same conundrum that had become quite an aporia 
for many biologists… 
In fact, this conundrum existed since the earliest attempts to consider the 
relative liveliness of computer viruses—or of any other kind of so-called artificial 
life—and the common method to get out of it appeared to be the description of a 
set of criteria or ‘properties’ supposed to characterize life. Such is the case of one 
of the earliest contributions stemming from the Santa Fe Institute, a site most 
associated with the emergence of the ALife research field. Following Chris 
Langton’s somewhat tautological inaugural definition of the field as ‘the study of 
man-made systems that exhibit behaviors characteristic of natural living systems’ 
(1989: 1), J. Doyne Farmer and Alletta d’A. Belin (1991) proposed a first set of nine 
such criteria: (1) pattern in spacetime, (2) self-reproduction, (3) information 
storage of a self-representation, (4) metabolism, (5) functional interactions with 
the environment, (6) interdependence of parts, (7) stability under perturbations, 
(8) ability to evolve, and (9) growth. But they offered this list of criteria 
reluctantly, after having acknowledged its incompleteness and imprecision, and 
moreover, after having stated ‘there seems to be no single property that 
characterizes life. Any property that we assign to life is either too broad, so that it 
characterizes many nonliving systems as well, or too specific, so that we can find 
																																								 																				
5 	John	 Johnston	 (2009:	 24)	 remarks	 ‘computer	 viruses	 were	 one	 of	 the	 few	 topics	 that	
Christopher	Langton	actively	sought	to	discourage	at	the	first	ALife	conference	in	1987’.	Johnston	
also	 refers	 to	Mitchell	 Waldrop,	 who	 nevertheless	 added	 that	 in	 one	 sense	 computer	 viruses	
were	 ‘a	natural’	 to	be	 first	 considered	as	Alife:	 they	 ‘could	do	almost	everything	 carbon-based	
life-forms	did	[…]	but	computer	viruses	were	also	dangerous’	(Waldrop	1992:	238).	Organizing	a	
conference	in	a	U.S.	National	Laboratory	probably	made	not	wanting	to	‘attract	hackers	to	come	
to	Los	Alamos	and	try	to	get	into	the	secure	computers’	(238)	a	safe	idea.	
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counterexamples that we intuitively feel to be alive, but that do not satisfy it’ 
(818). 
In spite of its aporetic nature, the criteria method kept on being used: for 
instance, Spafford examined the same nine criteria applied to computer viruses, 
only to conclude that ‘our study of computer viruses at first suggests they are 
close to what we might define as “artificial life”. However, upon closer 
examination, a number of significant deficiencies can be found. These lead us to 
conclude that computer viruses are not “alive”, nor is it possible to refine them so 
as to make them ‘alive’ without drastically altering our definition of “life”’ 
(Spafford 1994: 262). Such a ‘definition of life’ however, has remained at best 
elusive, even to this day. In a recent paper, Yong Zher Koh and Maurice Ling 
(2013) have examined no less than 135 definitions of life, spanning the years 
1865–2011. Their conclusion, again, left the conundrum intact: ‘a computer virus 
as a digital organism’ they wrote, ‘can be considered as alive as a bacterium or as 
alive as a biological virus, depending on the definition’. 
It seems that one encounters here what constructivist sociologists of 
science used to call ‘interpretive flexibility’, the presence of ‘differing 
interpretations of the natural world’ (Pinch & Bijker 1984: 420). What’s even 
more interesting here is that the situation at hand does not only display strong 
evidence for scientific interpretive flexibility about the definition of life, but also 
technological interpretive flexibility about the design of ‘lively’ artifacts. In their 
founding paper, Pinch and Bijker insist on these two kinds of ‘interpretive 
flexibility’ and explain how the second adds to the first: ‘not only that there is 
flexibility in how people think of, or interpret, artefacts, but also that there is 
flexibility in how artefacts are designed’ (421). 
Most crucially here, scientific interpretive flexibility then becomes a 
resource for the sustainability of alternative designs, as is evident in this remark 
from Stefan Helmreich: ‘Biologists disagree about whether viruses are alive, and 
Artificial Life scientists have appropriated this uncertainty to argue about whether 
computer viruses might not be borderline cases for artificial life. Figuring 
computer viruses this way allows researchers to claim that there is in fact a 
threshold to be crossed’ (1998: 129). In a more recent paper the same author 
insisted: ‘Artificial Life can be read as a sign of the instability, the limits, of 
nature as an ontological category. Biology becomes ungrounded. The form of life 
prepared by belief in these life forms is one in which bioengineering practice can 
simultaneously lean on ‘life’ as a category and know that it is constructed’ (2011: 
683). This paper insists on the notion of ‘limit’, ‘the point at which an identity 
uncouples from itself, shades or snaps into something else’ (684).  
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Although I understand and value the point Helmreich makes in this paper 
with such a conceptual tool, I would rather stick to the notion of ‘threshold’ in his 
original quote. What is at stake here, again, is not only the differing scientific 
interpretations of what ‘life’ actually is, but rather the technoscientific interpretive 
flexibility about how to design life forms, a point that Stefan Helmreich and Sofia 
Roosth make in yet another paper: ‘that “life” in this field [synthetic biology] is 
treated as a coherent entity, despite the fact that what is at stake is its material, 
attests to the capaciousness of the concept of life form to designate conjectural 
possibilities that nonetheless stabilize present kinds’ (2010: 42). 
In an early account of the attempts to synthetize micro-organisms 
published in Science, Dan Ferber noticed how biologists were then wary of this 
interpretive flexibility: ‘Despite many early successes, synthetic biologists might 
be getting ahead of themselves. Much more needs to be known about the basics of 
cellular “device physics”—including where proteins are located, how fast they 
turn over, and what other proteins they talk to, says Eisenstadt. “We’d like to be 
building life forms from first principles”, says Venter, “but it’s kind of hard when 
you don’t know all the first principles”. And after all is said and done, researchers 
may never be able to make a synthetic cell at all, Venter says: “People should not 
accept as a fait accompli that this will work”’ (Ferber 2004: 161). 
Now, ten years later, people should accept that building life forms is a fait 
accompli. The threshold has been crossed, and by none other than the excessively 
humble—for once—Craig Venter, who else? That, in the meantime, we still do 
not ‘know all the first principles’, that still ‘much more needs to be known’ is, in 
the end, irrelevant. And resistance is futile, as any good SF fan will tell you. This 
pretty much seems to be the position of some of today’s (bio)hackers. Please meet 
‘Mario’, aka ‘Second Part To Hell’ (SPTH), a contributor and founding member 
of hh86, ‘a female Argentine hacker’6 who is the editor of the valhalla ezine; in 
other words, a man of many ‘handles’. A virus programmer since he was 15 years 
old, SPTH is a long-time member of the ‘virus underground’ (see Thompson 
2004) which sure knows first-hand that ‘building life forms is a fait accompli’. In 
October of 2013, he released on his homepage (and published in Valhalla #4 in 
November 2013) a text that proves it. He wrote: 
Biological life spreads in the biological-chemical world, computer codes can 
spread in the digital computer world. That is a rule—no self-replicator has 
ever overcome the digital-biological barrier. Until today. Here I show a 
																																								 																				
6	‘In	analogon	to	Nicolas	Bourbaki	(the	pseudonym	of	a	mathematician	collective),	together	with	
a	few	other	programmers	we	sometimes	release	stuff	using	the	handle	“hh86”.	In	order	to	attrac
t	more	attention,	we've	defined	that	pseudonym	to	be	female.	;)	Thats	[sic]	the	same	concept	as	
“roy	g	biv”—three	or	four	people	behind	one	pseudonym.	Maybe	this	is	an	improved	concept	to	
a	“virus	writing	group”’(Alcopaul	&	Brigada	Ocho	2011;	see	also	SPTH	&	DarK	CodeZ	#5	2013).	
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method how a digital computer code can infect biological DNA, thus spread 
in the biological-chemical world. The method is mainly based on the fantastic 
research by the J. Craig Venter Institute on synthetic life, and might ask new 
questions about the definition of life itself (SPTH 2013). 
His last entry on the ‘main’ section of his homepage at the time of the 
writing of the present paper, dated February 8, 2014, comments on the aftermath 
of this publication: 
Mikko Hypponen has mentioned my research in infecting biological DNA 
with digital Computer Code in his talk in Cambridge on ‘Silicon Plagues’ (see 
minute 51++). […] I am a bit worried about the risk of abusing such 
techniques by criminals, nation states, you name it. Similar as computers are 
abused and can cause alot of trouble, also synthized DNA can be abused, 
but obviously on a much more dangerous scale. Compared to that, abusing 
computers seems like some kiddy games. Per fortuna, yet we are far from 
the point were synthesizing DNA and booting up bacteria with it is possible 
on a big scale (Venter compares it with the 40s or 50s of electronic 
computers). Actually, afaik Craig Venter's lab is the only place where this 
can be done yet. As a conclusion I think Mikko's statement ‘Do not write a 
computer virus that is able to infect DNA’ is of course true, but a bit too naive. 
Synthezised DNA has the potential to change our lifes in future 
tremendously (maybe similar or even more than computers have done), but 
can (and most likely will) be abused aswell - obviously in a much worse way 
than computers can ever be. I wonder if somebody is thinking about serios 
solutions. Those bio-researchers have done some ethical studies, but I don't 
know how they evaluate the long-term risk. And security-people might be not 
be interested, as there has not been any accident yet or because the field is 
too different. Well, maybe it's SciFi after all (SPTH 2013). 
Famous last words (in broken English)… so far. So we had better get 
ready for brand new epidemics. Unless, in accordance with some recent 
virological theories, what can appear as a maleficent epidemic could in fact hold 
the key to new forms of evolution, resilience and symbiosis. 
Convergent Life and Suzugia 
In my perspective, a threshold is not a limit, ‘a point at which an identity 
uncouples from itself, shades or snaps into something else’ (Helmreich, 2011: 
694); it is rather a critical point, in a sense derived from Simondon’s ontogenetic 
model. In this model, Simondon makes use of the notion of ‘phase’ in the sense of 
thermodynamics: ‘one cannot conceive of a phase except in relation to another or 
to several other phases,’ he writes, only to add, ‘in a system of phases there is a 
relation of equilibrium and of reciprocal tensions; the present system of all the 
phases taken together is the complete reality’ (1989 [1958]: 159). Moreover, he 
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insists: ‘the existence of a plurality of phases defines the reality of a neutral centre 
of equilibrium in relation to which the phase shift exists’. This notion of ‘phase 
shift’ or ‘phase transition’ is crucial for me to understand what I mean by ‘critical 
point’ here. Simondon associates the notion of ‘neutral point’ to the notion of 
equilibrium, since ‘no phase, as phase, is in equilibrium in relation to itself, nor 
does it have complete truth or reality: every phase is partial, abstract, and 
unbalanced; only the system of phases is in equilibrium at its neutral point; its 
truth and its reality are this neutral point, the procession and conversion in relation 
to this neutral point’ (160). The neutral point is not a phase of being in the world, 
but rather ‘a permanent reminder of the rupture of [a prexisting] unity’, extending 
the existence of this lost unity and thus reaffirming it, when phases ‘are in conflict 
in relation to the neutral point’. Phase shifts, or transitions, only exist in relation to 
a neutral point of equilibrium, as ‘true and balanced relations only exist between 
phases of the same level [...] in a genetic ensemble balanced around a neutral 
point, envisaged in its totality’ (161). Phases are usually in an ‘either/or relation’ 
to each other (they are in conflict, says Simondon), only to converge in an ‘and’ 
relation (coexistence) at the neutral point. There is yet another possible relation, of 
course, when the relation means the disappearance of both phases: it is the so-
called ‘critical state’.  
All this comes from the vocabulary of thermodynamics that Simondon 
borrows. In the first case, when the phases coexist in an equilibrium point, 
thermodynamics speak of a first-order phase transition; in the second, when their 
distinction disappears, of a second-order phase transition. The critical state is a 
homogeneous thermodynamic state occurring in a second-order phase transition, 
at a so-called ‘critical point’ where the distinctive features of the phases gradually 
disappear. For Simondon, first-order phase transitions only reaffirm a lost unity 
but are not analogous to it, since at the equilibrium the phases co-exist, and still 
result from the loss of unity by division (this is, I think, what Helmreich means by 
‘limit’). Only a critical state, and thus a second-order phase transition, could 
eventually be analogous to the lost unity, but Simondon does not make mention of 
it.  
So let me rephrase my point: the threshold between analog and digital life 
qua viruses is this critical point where digital and analog life eventually appear 
as phases of life, at a second order phase transition point where their distinctive 
features disappears and the lost unity of life reappears. 
And this exactly is where Licklider’s intuition kicks back and reunites 
with Margulis’ intuition: the lost unity is symbiotic in nature, the lost unity of 
junk as the principle that binds. Junk is another word for rhizome; the fabric of the 
rhizome is junk (Bardini 2011). From the metonymical powers invested in junk 
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and the conjunctive principle that does away with the jerking reflexes of identity 
at all cost, from within the community of the yoke, or suzugia,7 that binds all life 
forms, junk rules as an ultraliberal despot would. Junk is, after all, the very image 
of the reticulated structure of the living world, this ecology of (co)design. From 
the molecular to the molar, from the earliest somatic plastids and the most 
rudimentary gemmules, before there was sex or when all there was was sex, 
undifferentiated and yet differentiating, when sex was proto-sex, intermingling 
exchange of code, life forces and energy, affects and infects, there was already 
junk, looming as the archetypical figure of the potential, of this potentiality of the 
potential (this raising at a higher degree of life, this potenzirung, this 
romanticizing, says Novalis) that we have come to call life. Viruses, be they 
analog or digital, are the ultimate junk code, the vector princeps of life as code 
(Bardini 2012). 
There you have it. But there might still be a point that needs to be made. 
How could viruses be considered symbiotic partners? To understand this, one 
would have to get rid of their most shared connotation, not as vectors of infectious 
diseases, but rather as vectors of life. I have already alluded to some recent results 
and theories in virology that seem to go along this direction. Let me expand on 
them a bit now. I refer here to the work of Luis Villarreal and Frank Ryan:  
A similar complex, multi-faceted contribution of viral symbiosis is 
increasingly found throughout all the biological disciplines, working at many 
levels of virus – host interaction, and including both exogenous and 
endogenous viruses […] At molecular genetics level, it is becoming 
increasingly established that viruses can have a significant impact on the 
content and regulation of the chromosomes of host cells. It is possible that 
viral symbiosis may have contributed to the origins of nuclei, to key enzymes 
involved in DNA and even whole chromosomal replication […] The potential 
for future research into viral symbiosis would appear to be considerable. 
Since virus–host symbioses are universal, such potential will extrapolate to 
theoretical aspects of evolutionary biology as well as to the practical 
applications, including medicine, veterinary medicine, agriculture, and 
ecology (2011: 87–8). 
… and computer science. Villarreal and Ryan insist ‘Virologists may be skeptical 
of a symbiotic perspective in what appears to be a situation of outright parasitism’. 
And so would almost everybody. But they dispel this problem two times: (1) ‘A 
common misconception is to equate symbiosis with mutualism’, and (2) the 
introduction of the concept of ‘aggressive symbiosis’. 
																																								 																				
7	‘The	 Greeks,	 to	 express	 this	 so	 solid	 and	 nevertheless	 mute	 relationship	 that	 is	 the	 lived	
sympathy,	 used,	 even	 for	 the	 human	 couple,	 the	 word	 suzugia,	 community	 under	 the	 yoke’	
(Simondon	2005:	249).	
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Referring to yet another definition of ‘symbiosis’ than the one Licklider 
used, Anton de Bary’s 1878 original definition, 8  they note this definition 
‘embraced parasitism and commensalism as well as mutualism. All that is 
required is a living interaction’ (Villarreal & Ryan 2011: 80). This first point is 
purely formal: if it corrects a semantic misconception, it does not explain how the 
negative connotation (infectious vector) can give way to a more positive 
conception (vectors of evolution or life). The second point does, but at the price of 
the introduction of a rather counter-intuitive (or even oxymoronic?) concept, that 
of aggressive symbiosis. This stems from the work of Frank Ryan (1998), who 
first thought of it while looking for ‘virus X’. He later explained it as such: 
When two or more partners enter into a mutualistic symbiosis, each partner 
will contribute an innate ability, or trait, that the other partner lacks. It is 
obvious what a host contributes to a virus–host partnership, since it offers 
the virus shelter and the use of the host’s own genetic machinery to make 
more copies of itself. Without the host the virus would not survive. But 
although it might appear less obvious, there is in fact a key ability that the 
virus possesses—in evolutionary terms, a ‘trait’—that the host does not. This 
is the innate potential for lethal aggression (Ryan 2009: 89). 
In other words: sure, an infectious virus might eradicate most of a 
population it infects; but those individuals who survive acquire an evolutionary 
trait quite valuable: the ability to use the virus aggressiveness to eradicate 
uninfected individuals, populations or even species that could invade their 
territory. Talk about unfair competition! Ryan and Villarreal have even described 
the molecular functioning of such an aggressive symbiosis with yet another 
counter-intuitive concept: the addiction module first introduced by Yarmolinski 
(See Villarreal 2005:66–9, 166–7). For clarity’s sake, I will only give Frank 
Ryan’s somewhat clear explanation of this concept here: 
In essence, the virus deposits a copy of its complete genome inside the 
body of the bacterium, while keeping the viral genome separate from that of 
the bacterium in a tiny envelope, known as a plasmid. The viral genome is 
fully competent—in other words, it is capable of making a complete 
infectious virus—and hence is known as a ‘prophage’. The prophage also 
codes for two specifically evolved metabolic products, one of which has a 
long-lived effect that, if unopposed, is lethally toxic to its host, while the 
second product, the effects of which are short-lived, offers protection against 
the lethal toxin. From the bacterial point of view, it would be ideal if it could 
rid itself of the potentially lethal presence of the virus […] But if the bacteria 
jettisons the plasmid, the anti-toxin effects wear off quickly, while the long-
lived toxin is still operative. The bacterium is killed. Not only does this 
situation results in the death of the host, but the same ferocious virus is also 
																																								 																				
8	‘The	living	together	of	differently	named	organisms’	quoted	in	(Sapp	1994:	7).	
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operative in the environment and will kill, through lysis, all bacteria that do 
not possess the addiction module—in other words, all bacteria that does not 
contain itself (2009: 188). 
A subtle dialectic based on a differential chronological mastery appears to be the 
key to an aggressive symbiosis. A competitive advantage results from a well-
mastered addiction, i.e. from an imbedded and time sensitive rapport de puissance. 
That will provide me with a smooth transition to my conclusion. 
Coda Redux: Viral Life, After Theory 
‘Standing as they do at the border between the “living” and the non-living, and 
virtually real, viruses serve to challenge almost every dogmatic tenet about the 
logic of life, defying any tidy division of the physical […] into organisms, the 
inorganic, and engineered artifacts’ (Ansell-Pearson 1997). 
Keith Ansell-Pearson’s intuition dates from the year 1997, but it seems 
even more prophetic now. During the month of April of the year 2010 of the 
modern era, a tiny parasite got a new name that would soon become a household 
icon: an allegedly new strain of the Marpurg virus, first christened Zaire 
ebolavirus, quite simply became ‘the Ebola virus’. In May of that same year, 
while most civilized human beings seemed to still believe in the exploits of 
science and technology—administered with a reasonable dose of public relation 
mastery—a man claimed that he was ‘the first human infected with a computer 
virus’. In the same month of that same year, Science reported the creation of a 
bacterial cell controlled by a chemically synthesized genome (Venter et al. 2010), 
later introduced as Synthia, ‘the first species to have the computer as a parent’ 
(Venter 2012). The next month, the Stuxnet computer virus (or worm, depending 
on the reports) destroyed a large number of centrifuges that were a vital part of 
Iran's nuclear enrichment process. At the end of the year, as winter approached, 
Google Flu Trends was found to be ‘nearly on par’ with the Center for Diseases 
Control Surveillance Data. This time, Scientific American concluded: ‘searching 
for flu symptoms online is a reasonable proxy for actually having them’ (Moisse 
2010). In 2010, for better or for worse, we lived under the constant threat of the 
virus, it appears. 
The year 2010 was not a particularly special year, however. Radical claims 
of uniqueness and first occurrences abounded then, but they continue to abound. 
In fact, they now swarm at the rhythm of viral marketing campaigns, whereby 
‘viral’ itself has become a sign of success. How exactly did that happen? How on 
Earth could the master villain have become the very emblem of triumph, while at 
the same time retaining his former status of ‘public enemy number one’? I have 
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argued here that the virus is no metaphor, no coincidence under the same name, 
but rather a real, actual thing, as alive as you and me; as much alive, but not 
exactly alive in the same way you and me are alive: alive, virally. 
Furthermore, I argue that if we want to understand what life is 
becoming—our, human life, but also life in general—we must take note of what 
the virus has to teach us. In this sense, I claim, viral life is a model for all lives, 
however evolved they pretend to be. Put in ontogenetic terms, the virus is the 
model organism (as biologists would say) for a new ontology absolutely required 
to make sense of our present—or soon to be present—condition. 
As the few aforementioned 2010 instances want to indicate, the virus is 
such a model organism for our new condition because, it has truly and definitely, 
passed the threshold that used to separate the analog from the digital, or as 
everybody errs to think these days, the ‘virtual worlds’ from the material world. 
There is, of course, only one world and it is and always will be, as it has always 
been, both material and immaterial, continuous and discreet, analog and digital. 
The illusion of separation into distinct realms of what are, after all, only 
modalities or modes of existence within the same, one and only world, is the first 
illusion to dispel. It used to be a matter of principle—or a philosophical point of 
contention—it is now in evidence. 
What is a virus, but a minimal life form? A virus is basically a piece of 
code (be it DNA or RNA), only able to protect itself through the synthesis of a 
few proteins, and invade a host through the synthesis of some other proteins. 
What does it mean then, if (some) biologists now say that viruses are alive? DNA 
barely exists as such anyways, except as a laboratory artifact. In nature, it exists 
under the form of chromatin, where the nucleic acid is intrinsically bounded with 
histone proteins. In other words, in biology too, as Friedrich Kittler once said, 
there is no software, or more accurately, ‘software does not exist as a machine-
independent faculty’ (Kittler 1995). And this machine metaphor makes even more 
sense when one considers the convergence of the analog and digital modalities of 
the contemporary existence of the virus. The dual archeology of the virus—both 
as computer virus and biological virus—has reached a turning point, and 
everything it entails has to be reconsidered upside down. The archeology of the 
virus as a form of life (computer code) has to be completed and reevaluated with 
the help of the archeology of the virus as a life form (infectious agent of life and 
death): at the very moment when both merge, a new condition emerges. 
Hence, I repeat: the virus is, in all of its modalities, should be considered 
alive. Both biological and computer viruses, and everything that stands in between 
as a hybrid, a symbiosis, or whatever that might bind them, should be considered 
alive. Viral life, at last. 
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